Abstract. Fix a small nonempty set of blockcipher keys K. We say a blockcipherbased hash function is highly-efficient if it makes exactly one blockcipher call for each message block hashed, and all blockcipher calls use a key from K. Although a few highly-efficient constructions have been proposed, no one has been able to prove their security. In this paper we prove, in the ideal-cipher model, that it is impossible to construct a highly-efficient iterated blockcipher-based hash function that is provably secure. Our result implies, in particular, that the Tweakable Chain Hash (TCH) construction suggested by Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner (Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO '02, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2442, pp. 31-46, Springer, Berlin, 2002 is not correct under an instantiation suggested for this construction, nor can TCH be correctly instantiated by any other efficient means.
Introduction
Background Essentially all modern hash functions are built by iterating a compression function according to the Merkle-Damgård paradigm [4, 11] . Moreover, these compression functions are almost always built from a blockcipher. Constructions like the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) compression function [9] are explicit about their use of a blockcipher, but even so-called "dedicated" hashing primitives like MD5 and SHA-1 are in fact blockcipher-based. The SHA-1 compression function, for example, uses a 160-bit blockcipher that takes a 512-bit key; this blockcipher has been named SHACAL-1 [7] .
This idea of building hash functions from blockciphers goes back more than 25 years. The earliest construction by Rabin [13] proposed to hash a message M = Fig. 1 . The Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) compression function [9] . E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a block cipher; the hatch mark denotes the location of the key. Iterating this compression function results in a provably-secure hash function [2] , however notice that the above compression function will be rekeyed each round. [10] and MMO followed, but it was Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle [12] who conducted the first systematic study of blockcipher-based hash functions. They considered the security of 64 iterated constructions with compression functions of the form f (h i−1 , m i ) = E a (b) ⊕ c, where a, b, c ∈ {h i−1 , m i , h i−1 ⊕ m i , v} for some fixed constant v. The analysis of PGV was attack-based, and schemes not broken by their attacks were deemed secure. Subsequently, Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [2] considered these same 64 constructions using a proof-based approach. They showed that, in the ideal-cipher model, 20 of the 64 schemes are collision-resistant up to the birthday bound; Fig. 1 gives one example.
Although provably secure, these 20 schemes could be viewed as inefficient in the following sense: in each, the blockcipher key is changed every round. For all conventional blockciphers, changing the key each round is undesirable since scheduling a new key entails a significant computational cost. It is natural to ask then if it is possible to achieve provable security without incurring this cost, and this question is the focus of our work.
Main Result Fix a small nonempty set of blockcipher keys K. We term a blockcipherbased hash function highly-efficient if its compression function uses exactly one call to a blockcipher (i.e., it is rate-1) and if the blockcipher uses only keys from K. Since we can preschedule each key in K, we enjoy a significant performance gain: key scheduling reduces to looking up a precomputed permutation. It is possible that those researchers who have worked on blockcipher-based hash functions over the past 25 years have considered highly-efficient constructions but found attacks that broke these constructions or were unable to prove their security. Indeed, the present authors also spent some time trying to find highly-efficient constructions without success. We now explain why.
One would like to construct a highly-efficient hash function that is provably collision resistant. If such a construction did exist, its underlying compression function could be constructed as follows (see Fig. 2 ): let f 1 : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and f 2 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be arbitrary functions. We define f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, The general compression function built from a blockcipher keyed from K. Functions f 1 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and f 2 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n are arbitrary; E K is some n-bit blockcipher with key K ∈ K selected by a deterministic key-selection function g.
where E K is an n-bit blockcipher with key K ∈ K that is the output of a deterministic key-selection function g. It isn't hard see that this construction captures all possible rate-1 compression functions built from a blockcipher used in the forward direction and keyed from K: both f 1 and f 2 may process every bit of the input to f in any arbitrary way. Notice that it is not necessary to feed forward the output of f 1 to f 2 , since f 2 can compute f 1 (h i−1 , m i ) itself. The key-selection function g must be deterministic and well defined, but beyond this may depend on other message blocks, chaining values, the round number, or other parameters, provided that it always returns a value from K. These notions are made precise in Sect. 2. (Note that this approach does not capture all blockcipher-based hash functions with a fixed key-set, only those that are iterated via Merkle-Damgård and that use the blockcipher in the forward direction.)
In this paper we prove that any compression function constructed as just described cannot, in the information-theoretic ideal cipher model, produce a provably collision-resistant hash function when iterated. Specifically, we show-in the idealcipher model-that for any functions f 1 , f 2 , there exists an information-theoretic adversary that finds a collision in the iterated function H f in at most |K|(n + lg(n) + 2 lg(|K|) + 1) + 1 blockcipher invocations. In fact, for many natural functions f 1 , f 2 (like XOR), we find collisions in just 2|K| blockcipher invocations. This is in stark contrast to the Θ(2 n/2 ) expected invocations needed to produce a collision in the 20 rekeying constructions that were proved secure in [2] . Our impossibility proof uses a greedy algorithm that builds large numbers of messages along with their associated hash outputs. In the case |K| = 1, we prove that this algorithm builds a tree with height at most n + lg(n) containing at least 2 n (n + lg(n) ) + 1 hash values, thereby yielding a collision on some level of the tree. A similar pigeonhole argument holds for |K| > 1. We stress that our results should not be interpreted as giving practical attacks on all highlyefficient hash functions: our attacks have exponential running time. Instead we are exhibiting a proof that no highly-efficient iterated blockcipher-based hash functions can exist in the model we have described. Some positive results on efficient (but not highly efficient as we have defined it) are given in recent work by Shrimpton and Stam [17] and Rogaway and Steinberger [14] . Both show that one can build a collision-resistant compression function by making three calls per round to an underlying random function or permutation. Security of Tweak Chain Hash Tweakable blockciphers were introduced by Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [8] . They define a tweakable blockcipher as a map E : {0,
n where the inputs are called the key, the tweak, and the message. We sometimes write E K (T , M) instead of E(K, T , M). For any fixed K ∈ {0, 1} k and T ∈ {0, 1} t , we require that E(K, T , ·) is a permutation on n bits. The idea is for the tweakable blockcipher to act like a normal blockcipher but with an extra (public) input, the tweak, which adds variability. The key may be expensive to schedule and to change, but changes to the tweak should be inexpensive. Security is defined as indistinguishability of a family of random permutations from E K (·, ·) with random key K, where the adversary controls the tweak and the message. See Sect. 2 for a formal definition.
Along with several other constructions, Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner suggest a new iterated hash-function construction built on tweakable blockciphers called the "Tweak Chain Hash" (TCH). This is a straightforward adaptation of the MMO construction into the tweakable setting: let E be a tweakable blockcipher with t = n, and fix a key K ∈ {0, 1} k . For any M ∈ ({0, 1} n ) + , write M = m 1 · · · m where each |m i | = n, and define
where h 0 is a fixed constant, say 0 n ; see Fig. 3 . A main motivation for TCH is efficiency: in each round, the (expensive to change) key K remains fixed while the (cheap to change) tweak and message vary. One might therefore expect TCH to be substantially faster than MMO.
However the security of TCH is left as an open question. In the same paper, the authors propose two ways to create tweakable blockciphers from conventional blockciphers: one construction based on the CBC-MAC and one using universal hash families. So it is natural to wonder whether TCH is secure when built using either of these constructions. But inserting the second construction into TCH yields a fixed-key rate-1 hash function constructed from a conventional blockcipher and given our results above, we would expect that any such construction should not be provably secure. In fact we show something even stronger.
We demonstrate that using either tweakable-blockcipher construction from Liskov et al., the resulting TCH construction admits a simple attack. These attacks produce an infinite number of same-length colliding message pairs under TCH, regardless of the parameters chosen for the underlying tweakable blockcipher and regardless of the security model. Appealing to our main result, we further show in the ideal-cipher model that any tweakable blockcipher-built using one call to a conventional blockciphercannot be used with the TCH construction and be proved secure. Our result does not, however, rule out TCH being secure when constructed from a tweakable blockcipher primitive, such as the Hasty Pudding cipher [15] . This is discussed further in Sect. 4 .
Security Model
The standard-model assumption for blockciphers is that they are good pseudo-random permutations (PRPs) [10] . However this assumption is insufficient for proving the security of hash functions based on blockciphers; indeed, Simon has shown [18] that the PRP assumption alone is insufficient for secure blockcipherbased hashing. For this reason, all proofs of security for blockcipher-based hash functions have been done in the ideal-cipher model [2, 10, 11, 18, 23] . This model, which dates back to Shannon [16] , treats a blockcipher as a random and independent permutation for each key. Some believe that modeling blockciphers in this way is not realistic: often we find correlations and biases in real blockciphers that one would not expect to see if the object were drawn uniformly from the family of all blockciphers with the same block and key size. Nonetheless, proofs of security in this model do have meaning: security is guaranteed against adversaries that ignore the structure of the underlying blockcipher.
Except for the two simple attacks given for TCH, all attacks in this paper are in the ideal-cipher model. We do not make any probabilistic assumptions nor do we depend on the permutivity of the blockciphers.
The prevailing methodology for measuring the security of blockcipher-based hash functions is that they are secure against information-theoretic adversaries in the idealcipher model [2] . Our adversaries are therefore information-theoretic. While this may seem to be giving too much power to an adversary when thinking of real-world attacks, we once again stress that our goal is to demonstrate the nonexistence of provably collision-resistant schemes, not to give practically instantiable attacks. Indeed, it is clearly impossible to exhibit a practical attack given the generality of our setting: f 1 could itself be a collision-resistant hash function, and a practical attack on the resulting hash function would imply a practical attack on f 1 .
Message Lengths Our definition for collision resistance will count as valid any pair of messages that produce the same hash value. Finding collisions in practice is often much harder than this due to techniques such as Merkle-Damgård strengthening [10] . In view of this, all attacks in this paper produce colliding messages of the same length and therefore still apply even in the presence of such techniques.
Security Definitions
Basic Notions Let k and n be positive integers. A blockcipher is a function E : {0,
n . Let Perm(n) be the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n , and let Bloc(k, n) be the set of all blockciphers E : {0,
a × {0, 1} n for some a ≥ 1 where a + n > c. (The parameters are chosen so that f is a nontrivial compression function-it properly compresses data.) If the program for computing f uses a single query
Fix a constant h 0 and let σ 0 = ε. We define a (highly-efficient, blockcipher-based) hash function by the following program:
n , and we say that
When it is understood from context, we will omit the superscript π to f , and E to H . We will also often omit explicit reference to g and K, simply writing
We write x $ ←S for the experiment of choosing a random element from the finite set S and calling it x. An adversary is an algorithm with access to one or more oracles, which we write as superscripts.
Collision Resistance
To quantify the collision resistance of a highly-efficient, blockcipher-based hash function, we model the blockcipher as a randomly chosen E ∈ Bloc(k, n). An adversary A is given oracles for E(·, ·) and its inverse E −1 (·, ·), and wants to find a collision for
. We look at the number of queries that the adversary makes and compare this with the probability of finding a collision.
Definition 1 (Collision Resistance of a Hash Function). Fix k, n > 0, and let
n be a blockcipher. Let K ⊂ {0, 1} k and S ⊆ {0, 1} * be nonempty sets, and let g :
n , and let A be an adversary. Then the advantage of A in finding collisions in H is the real number
For q ≥ 1, we write Adv
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries that ask at most q oracle queries.
, we are choosing 2 t random permutations on {0, 1} n , one for each T ∈ {0, 1} t . The permutation associated to T is π(T , ·).
Definition 2 (Security of Conventional and Tweakable Blockciphers
n be a tweakable blockcipher, and let A be an adversary. Then
, where the maxima are taken over all adversaries that ask at most q oracle queries.
Hash Function Constructions and Attacks
We begin this section with a more detailed discussion of the generalized rate-1 blockcipher-based compression function shown in Fig. 2 , and of certain assumptions we might make in practice (though our later proofs will make no such assumptions). Next we consider attacks on the iterated hash of this compression function. The first attack is particularly efficient (it requires only 2|K| blockcipher invocations), and we argue that it probably applies to many "reasonable" constructions for the compression function. The second is more general: it shows that there cannot exist an iterated hash function based on this type of compression function that is provably collision resistant in our model.
Generalized Rate-1 Blockcipher-Based Compression Function
We consider any compression function f that is built in the following way. Let Fig. 2 with π = E K . We will not formally argue that this construction covers all possible 2n to n bit functions that call π at most once; this would take us quite far afield. Instead we give the following informal justification.
The function f takes two n-bit inputs, h and m. We make both of these inputs available to the "preprocessing" function f 1 and to the "postprocessing" function f 2 . Additionally, f 2 has access to the output of π . We do not feed the output of f 1 to f 2 since f 2 is capable of recomputing f 1 itself. Similarly, we do not feed the output of f 2 back to f 1 since any computation performed by f 2 only on inputs h and m could have been computed by f 1 ; if the output of f 2 depends also on π , then it cannot be fed back into f 1 (and thus π ) because we are requiring f be rate-1.
Although f 1 and f 2 are fully arbitrary, we imagine that in practice they will be simple and fast-to-compute functions. In PGV [12] , for example, these functions are never more complex than XOR. It would make little sense to have f 1 be, say, SHA-1, since our overall construction is itself aiming to be a cryptographic hash function. Nonetheless, our results continue to hold even for such far-fetched constructions: since our adversary is information-theoretic, it is able to find all 2n-bit inputs that yield some particular n-bit output for f 1 , and we do not concern ourselves with the computational resources required to do so.
The Two-Fiber Attack We begin by describing a simple collision-finding attack called the "two-fiber attack" which works on many natural highly-efficient constructions, including all of the fixed-key constructions from [12] . In this attack the function f 1 has a certain property, which we call the "two-fiber property." We now explain.
Let f −1
This is commonly called the fiber of f 1 under i, or the i-fiber. We now define the notion of a well-balanced fiber or function.
Definition 3 (Well-Balanced Fibers). Fix integer n > 0, and let
n appears exactly once as a first coordinate of some ordered pair of f −1 (i). If every fiber of f is well balanced, then we say that f is a well balanced.
An example of a well-balanced function is f
n for each h ∈ {0, 1} n , then f 1 is be well balanced.
For the purposes of the present attack, we require only that there exist distinct
If f 1 has two such fibers, we say that f 1 has the two-fiber property, and the resulting attack is called the two-fiber attack. Notice that this property can be determined by the adversary without requiring any E-queries.
The attack is given in the theorem below. The idea behind the attack is that by doing just 2|K| queries to E on points i 1 and i 2 , an adversary can produce arbitrarily many same-length messages along with their hash values. h, m) )), where f 1 has the two-fiber property. Finally, let the hash function
Theorem 4 (Two-Fiber Attack). Fix k, n > 0, and let
are wellbalanced fibers. We now define A E,E −1 , a collision-finding adversary for H . First A makes 2|K| queries to its left oracle at (K, i 1 ) and (K, i 2 ) for each K ∈ K. With the resulting values, A grows a rooted tree T . Tree T will be annotated with node-labels and edge-labels; the edge-labels will represent message blocks, and the node-labels will contain the intermediate hash values obtained by traversing T from the root to that node. Note that multiple nodes in the tree may contain the same node-labels. Edges are added by specifying an ordered pair (u, v) of node labels where u is a node-label already in T and v is a new node with label v. Thus each edge-addition always creates a leaf. Each time we add an edge to T , we will also specify the label for that edge.
Let the root of T be labeled h 0 . Since h 0 ∈ {0, 1} n and f −1
In the case that MD-strengthen is used, an additional lg(|K|) iterations of the attack must be executed. To see this, notice that a collision at the leaves, prior to MDstrengthening, does not guarantee a collision after MD-strengthening: the state σ used by the key-selection algorithm may cause different keys to be used in the last blockcipher call. However, doubling the number of leaves for an additional lg(|calK|) steps will suffice to create collisions after MD-strengthening.
Note that the proof holds even if E K is not a permutation; we require only that E K be a map from n bits to n bits. Also notice that the colliding messages produced by A are the same length; this means that a length-encoding scheme like MD-strengthening does not help avert the attack, although because the key selected for the final processing of the length may be different, we are required to extend the attack a few extra steps.
There are several obvious extensions to the two-fiber attack: for example, had we not insisted that messages be of the same length, a single well-balanced fiber would have sufficed. Also, if f 1 did not have the two-fiber property, perhaps it had fibers in which every h ∈ {0, 1} n occurred at least twice among the first coordinates in those fibers. This would admit an analogous attack using |K| oracle queries. Rather than pursue these ideas further, we instead proceed to the generalized attack that shows that |K|(n + lg(n) + 2 lg(|K|) + 1) + 1 oracle queries are sufficient to find distinct samelength messages that collide for any generalized compression function.
Main Result
The central result of this paper is to show that no rate-1 compression function using blockcipher keys from a small fixed set K can give rise to a provably collision-resistant hash function when iterated. We show this by using at most |K|(n + lg(n) + 2 lg(|K|) + 1) + 1 oracle queries to produce an overwhelming number of hash outputs that correspond to distinct messages. More specifically, our attack implements an algorithm to grow a tree of messages where the number of nodes in the tree at least doubles with each level added to it. In the case where |K| = 1, we then show that the tree will have height at most n + lg(n) but with more than 2 n (n + lg(n) ) nodes, which means there must exist a collision at some level of the tree. A similar pigeonhole argument is used for the case where |K| > 1.
Although the theorems below hold for all n > 0, we restrict our statements to n ≥ 8 since small values are of no interest and addressing them would introduce special cases into the proofs. h, m) )), with f 1 and f 2 arbitrary. Let
Theorem 5 (General Attack). Fix k > 0, n ≥ 8, and let
n be the iterated hash of f . Then Adv coll H (|K|(n + lg(n) + 2 lg(|K|) + 1) + 1) = 1.
Proof. Like the two-fiber attack above, we will focus our attention on f 1 . We will conduct the proof initially for the case |K| = 1 and then generalize at the end. This means we may assume that g is trivial and K is fixed for all oracle queries. We construct an adversary A with oracles E, E −1 . We begin the proof by introducing an abstraction that will allow us to focus on the most important features of the problem. Let N = 2 n and for all i ∈ [0..
. . , R N −1 } and notice several things about R:
• Over all of the R i , there are exactly N ordered triples of the form (h, ·, ·) for each h ∈ {0, 1} n , since there are exactly N possible values for m.
• Since f 1 is a public function, A can sort each triple (h, m, ·) into the appropriate set R i , since membership depends only on f 1 (h, m).
• Since evaluating f (h, m) requires an oracle query, A will not initially know the value of the last coordinate of any ordered triple.
In light of the last bullet above, we will think of each triple in each R i as (h, m, ?) where "?" is a distinguished symbol indicating we do not yet know the value. Once we have A perform an oracle query (K, i) for some i ∈ [0..N − 1], we may fill in the last-coordinates for each triple in R i . Of course we are going to be stingy with our oracle queries, since we can spend at most |K|(n + lg(n) + 2 lg(|K|) + 1) + 1 of them. Now A grows a rooted tree T , the same as we did for the two-fiber attack: tree T will be annotated with node-labels and edge-labels; the edge-labels will represent message blocks, and the node-labels will contain the intermediate hash values obtained by traversing T from the root to that node. Edges are added by specifying an ordered pair (u, v) of node labels where u is already in T and v is a new node with label v. Note that multiple nodes in the tree may contain the same node-labels. Thus each edge-addition always creates a leaf, and if a node-label u appears multiple times in T , then multiple new nodes with label v will be added along with the corresponding edges. Each time we add an edge to T , we will also specify the label for that edge. Edges (h, f (h, m)) added to T will indicate that message block m gets us from chaining-value h to chainingvalue f (h, m). Therefore, we would label edge (h, f (h, m)) with m. We start with T having just one node labeled h 0 . Because A has not yet queried E, the tree can be extended no further at this point. Before proceeding to the attack, we establish some notation. At any time during the attack, we define t as the number of nodes in T and we let E be the set of triples used in T thus far. (Note that the number of edges in T may be larger than the number of Fig. 4 . The tree-building algorithm used by adversary A. Set J tracks the unqueried points; set E tracks the triples used in tree T . The algorithm chooses the maximum-scoring set R i that has not been previously queried, and queries E at (K, i). It then expands the tree using triples from the newly-discovered R i and from E. Function AddEdge(T , (u, v) , m) inserts into tree T an edge from the node labeled u to a new leaf labeled v using edge-label m. With each iteration of the main loop, the height of T grows by at most one, while the number of nodes in T at least doubles. We stop any time a collision occurs at some level of T ; we omit specifying the data structures for T and how collisions are detected. The score of R i measures the number of nodes we can add to T as a direct result of querying E(K, i). Moreover, adding these nodes only increases the height of T by at most one. The tree-building algorithm for A is the natural greedy algorithm: ask the query (K, i) that maximizes s(R i ) where ties are broken arbitrarily. Once A has filled in the triples of R i , it extends T by each relevant triple available; that is, if  (h, m, f (h, m) ) ∈ R i and h is a node in T , add edge (h, f (h, m)) to T with edgelabel m. A may have to artificially restrict itself to ensure that the height of T grows by no more than one for each iteration, but these nodes may be added in the next iteration. Thus, due to the restrictions from a prior step, A may be able to add further edges for already-discovered triples as well. So for each triple (h, m, j) in E, adversary A also adds an edge to any h in T where (h, j ) does not already appear as an edge. See Fig. 4 for the complete algorithm.
Our goal here is to argue that T increases exponentially in the number of nodes as it increases linearly in height. First, notice that an invariant of T is that s(E) + s(Ē) = tN . This is because s(E) + s(Ē) = s(E ∪Ē) = s(R * ) = tN . We now state and prove the key lemma. Fig. 5 . An example tree built during the attack for N = 4. We assume h 0 = 0 n and label the root accordingly. Thus far A has queried E at (K, 2), so the last coordinates of R 2 are filled in. Only the first two ordered triples of R 2 were useful, so E = {(0, 0, 1), (0, 2, 0)} and the edges (0, 1) and (0, 0) were added to T with edge labels 0 and 2, respectively. Also, t = 3, d = 2, and s(E) = 4, so s(Ē) = 8.
Lemma 6 (Tree-Doubling Lemma). At any point during the attack, if t > 1, there exists some unqueried value i ∈ {0, 1}
n such that querying E(K, i) allows at least t + 1 nodes to be added to T . Furthermore, if t = 1, there exists a query that allows at least 1 node to be added to T .
Proof of Lemma.
For t = 1, no E-queries have been asked. Therefore there must exist some R i ∈ R with at least one triple of the form (h 0 , m, ?) for any m ∈ {0, 1} n , which means there exists some R i with s(R i ) ≥ 1. Now assume that t > 1, which means at least one E-query has been asked by A. Thus there are at most N − 1 unqueried values remaining. We will now bound s(Ē). Let d be the number of "free extensions" we can make to T by applying triples already in E. Now, notice that s(E) = t − 1 + d. This is because s(E) gets a score of t − 1 from each of the t − 1 added nodes thus far but also gets an added score of d from the d triples in E we can add for free. Therefore s(Ē) = tN − t + 1 − d, and since this score must be distributed among at most N − 1 sets, we can use the pigeonhole principle to show that the minimum node-expansion possible when using the maximally-scoring set R i is
See Fig. 5 for a small example of the tree-doubling lemma. With this result in hand, we can now conclude the proof of the theorem. Since t increases by at least 1 from the first query and by at least t + 1 from subsequent queries, we can see by induction that after queries we will have at least 2 + 2 −1 − 1 nodes in T .
After n + lg(n) queries we are guaranteed at least nN + 2 lg(n) −1 N − 1 nodes in at most n + lg(n) + 1 levels of T . Ignoring the root node, this is at least nN + 2 lg(n) −1 N − 2 nodes in at most n + lg(n) levels. Since n ≥ 8, we have 2 lg(n) −1 ≥ lg(n) + 1 and
Thus there are more than (n + lg(n) )N nodes on at most n + lg(n) levels of T yielding a collision on some level. The same-length messages M and M that collide under hash function H are extracted from T by traversing T from the root to each colliding node and reading off the edge labels that form the message blocks of M and M . Finally, we extend this attack to the case where |K| > 1. Let κ = lg(|K|) . In this case, we make at most |K|( lg(n) + n + 2κ + 1) + 1 queries. We proceed exactly as above, except that each time that attack calls for a single E(K, i) query, we now ask |K| queries E(K, i), one for each K ∈ K. Since g at each step will choose one K ∈ K based on the path taken in the tree, we are guaranteed to have covered the query, and therefore the scoring function will still accurately count the tree expansion that would result from our queries. However, in this case we cannot stop after finding one level of the tree with more than 2 n nodes because, for two messages M, M which hash to the same intermediate value, the MD-strengthening round may use any of the keys in K. Also, we may not be satisfied with the fact that if we apply MD-strengthening to all the (at least) 2 n + 1 messages on that level, we are guaranteed a collision, because in order to find the two messages that collide, we will likely have to query E(·, ·) too many times. We must instead use the pigeonhole principle in several steps. First we make some extra queries such that we are guaranteed more than |K|2 n nodes on some level of the tree. Then there must be an intermediate hash value such that at least |K| + 1 messages hash to that value before MD-strengthening. Thus, by a final application of the pigeonhole principle, there must be at least two of the |K| + 1 messages which use the same key in the MD-strengthening round and, therefore, collide. Now we show that it is sufficient to make at most |K|( lg(n) + n + 2κ) queries in order to build a tree T with the required properties. After |K|( lg(n) + n + 2κ) queries, there are at least n|K| 2 N + 2 lg(n) −1 |K| 2 N − 1 nodes in n + lg(n) + 2κ + 1 levels of T . By a similar argument as above, ignoring the root node, this is more than (n + lg(n) )|K| 2 N nodes in at most n + lg(n) + 2κ levels. We now just need to show that |K|(n + lg(n) ) ≥ n + lg(n) + 2κ or that the following inequality holds:
This can be verified by noting that n + lg(n) ≥ 11 and then by using induction. After the tree is built, we need to make an extra |K| + 1 queries to determine the colliding messages. We will therefore make a total of |K|(n + lg(n) + 2 lg(|K|) + 1) + 1 queries to E.
Interpreting the Result
We have used the ideal-cipher model for the blockcipher and endowed the adversary with limitless computational abilities. In this setting we were able to find an attack far more efficient than we can for known-secure constructions like MMO. However, we must realize that this model is not realistic in two ways: (1) When we plug a real blockcipher in for E, say 256-bit Rijndael, and fix a key-selection algorithm g and key-set K, we do not then have a random object. We have a fixed public object that can be attacked via directed cryptanalysis. (2) If we attempt to mount the attacks described here, we will be using real computers with real computational limitations. Building a tree with Ω(2 n ) nodes is not feasible for typical values of n. Of course collisions will appear long before the tree reaches this size, under reasonable probabilistic assumptions, but even a tree containing Ω(2 n/2 ) nodes is impractical to store when n is (say) 160 or 256.
So one might reasonably ask if the attacks just shown are really of any concern at all. Perhaps we can use 256-bit Rijndael, fix a single key 0 256 , and find some fast and simple functions f 1 and f 2 that do not admit any "obvious" attacks on the resulting iterated hash function. This may very well produce a collision-resistant hash function in the same sense that SHA-256 or SHA-512 is thought to be collision resistant: no one has yet found collisions. However, we are taking a step backwards in this way of thinking because we are once again relying on the lack of effective attacks to give evidence of security. Indeed, in light of the recent groundbreaking attacks on cryptographic hash functions [19] [20] [21] [22] , we should be even more wary of this approach. In a sense, we would be designing yet another primitive when we already have several primitives without any known attacks (at the time of this writing) and a longer established presence. But one thing we can guarantee about such an object is this: it will never admit a proof of security in the established model.
The Tweak Chain Hash
n where the inputs are called the "key," the "tweak," and the "message," respectively. We sometimes write E K 
(T , M) instead of E(K, T , M). For any fixed K ∈ {0, 1}
k and T ∈ {0, 1} t , we require that E(K, T , ·) is a permutation on n bits. The idea is for a tweakable blockcipher to act like a normal blockcipher but with an extra (public) input, the tweak, which adds variability. The key may be expensive to schedule and to change, but changes to the tweak should be cheap. Security for a tweakable blockcipher was defined in Sect. 2.
In their paper, Liskov et al. give (among other things) two proposals for constructing tweakable blockciphers from conventional blockciphers, along with several other constructions for using tweakable blockciphers. Their paper suggests a new hash-function construction built on tweakable blockciphers called the "Tweak Chain Hash" (TCH), defined as follows: for any m ∈ ({0, 1} n ) + , write M = m 1 · · · m where each |m i | = n and define
where h 0 is a fixed constant, say 0 n , and E is a tweakable blockcipher with n = t and key K a constant; see Fig. 3 . Their idea is that this construction should be faster than blockcipher-based constructions that rekey: the key K is fixed, and only the tweak and message change for each message block digested. Since changing these two inputs should be cheap (i.e., nothing equivalent to rescheduling a key should be required), each round of TCH should be faster than a round of, say, MMO. The authors leave the security of TCH as an open question. This is a question we aim to address in this section.
The First Attack: TCH-CBC Liskov et al. give two provably-secure constructions of tweakable blockciphers from conventional blockciphers. The first construction is Fig. 6 . Two rounds of the TCH-CBC π hash function. Function π : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a fixed permutation. We can easily generate an infinite number of same-length message pairs that collide using this construction.
the CBC MAC of the two-block message M T . In other words, for a given blockcipher E, they define
. They show that this construction is birthday-close to the underlying blockcipher E. That is, Adv tprp E (q) < Adv prp E (q) + q 2 /2 n . We call this the "CBC construction."
Taking the CBC construction and inserting it into the TCH construction seems like a natural try at building a collision-resistant hash function from a blockcipher. However, we immediately notice that the resulting TCH-CBC scheme is rate-1/2; that is, two blockcipher calls are required for each message block digested. (This means that our analysis from Sect. 3 does not apply because the compression function here is not rate-1.) This may in fact be more expensive than a rate-1 scheme that rekeys (like MMO). But TCH-CBC would be an interesting scheme nonetheless because it fixes the blockcipher key; no secure scheme has ever been exhibited that does this.
Unfortunately TCH-CBC is not collision resistant, as we now show. Fix a key K: this induces a fixed permutation that, for notational convenience, we name π = E K . For any M ∈ ({0, 1} n ) + , write M = m 1 · · · m where each |m i | = n, and define TCH-CBC
where, as usual, h 0 is some fixed constant. See Fig. 6 . Now, for a two-block message M = m 1 m 2 , we have
Let M * c = π −1 (c ⊕ h 0 ) c and notice that h(M * c ) = h 0 for any c ∈ {0, 1} n , yielding a large number of 2-block collisions. This idea can easily be generalized to generate collisions for messages of any even number of blocks >2 as well.
The Second Attack: TCH-AXU The second tweakable blockcipher construction proposed by Liskov et al. is based on the use of a universal hash family [3] . The flavor they used are known as -AXU 2 hash families. This is the preferred flavor because it leads to an efficient tweakable-blockcipher construction with good security. However, as we Fig. 7 . Two rounds of the TCH-AXU π hash function. Function π : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a fixed permutation, and u : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a fixed arbitrary function. We can easily generate an infinite number of same-length message pairs that collide using this construction.
will see, plugging their construction into TCH allows a simple attack, and this attack does not depend on the -AXU 2 property. Definition 7 ( -AXU 2 Hash Families). Fix n > 0. We say that a set of functions U = {u : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n } is -AXU 2 if for all x, y, z ∈ {0, 1} n with x = y,
Now let E be a blockcipher, let U be an -AXU 2 hash family whose functions map n bits to n bits and define
We call this the "AXU construction."
Let us try inserting the AXU construction into TCH and see if the resulting TCH-AXU construction is secure. Note that the AXU construction has a longer key since both the key for the underlying blockcipher and the function u must be specified. However, since TCH is a keyless object, we once again must fix both of these keys. Of course, fixing u means selecting some single function from U , and since U is an -AXU 2 hash family, most of the functions in this set will be "good" in the sense that they will be injective or nearly injective. However, as we will see, the properties of the particular function u are irrelevant in our attack: it is effective no matter what n-bit to n-bit function is supplied.
Once we have selected a fixed key K and function u, we have a rate-1 fixed-key blockcipher-based hash function, and our results from Sect. 3 immediately tell us the construction is insecure. However, it is even worse than this: there is a very simple attack that yields an infinite number of same-length message pairs that collide, as we now demonstrate.
Fix a key K and a function u from the family U . For notational convenience, we
where, as usual, h 0 is some fixed constant. See Fig. 7 . Now, for a two-block message M = m 1 m 2 , we have
Let M * c = u(h 0 ) ⊕ c u(π(c) ⊕ c) and notice that h(M * c ) = π(0) for any c ∈ {0, 1} n , yielding a large number of 2-block collisions. This idea can easily be generalized to generate collisions for messages of any even number of blocks >2 as well.
The Security of TCH The preceding two attacks do not imply that any tweakable blockcipher constructed as a mode on a conventional blockcipher will yield an easilybreakable TCH construction. It just so happened that the two modes given by the authors did fall to simple attacks. However, we can imagine that other tweakable-blockcipher constructions where attacks on the resulting TCH are not so obvious. But the results of this paper tell us that if the tweakable blockcipher were constructed from a single call to a conventional blockcipher, the resulting TCH would not have a proof of security and would therefore have to be treated as a primitive.
A New Model It is natural to ask whether TCH works under any model for tweakable blockciphers. And it is fairly clear that extending the ideal-cipher model to the tweakable setting does the trick: let k, t, n ≥ 1 be numbers. Define TBloc(k, t, n) be the set of all tweakable blockciphers E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} t × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . Choosing a random element of TBloc(k, t, n) means that for each (K, T ) ∈ {0, 1} k × {0, 1} t , one chooses a random permutation E K (T , ·).
For TCH, we require t = n and we fix the key K to some constant. But this immediately reduces to MMO in the ideal-cipher model for conventional blockciphers, which was previously proved secure [2] . We have essentially lost the distinction between the key and the tweak since in our new ideal-tweakable-cipher model they are equivalent. The notion that the tweak is public and the key is secret has been lost. The notion that the tweak should be cheap to change while the key is normally expensive to change has similarly been lost.
What does provable security in the ideal-tweakable-cipher model mean? Notice that in each of the above attacks on TCH we exploited details of the construction of the underlying tweakable blockcipher. Had we treated these underlying objects as black boxes, we would have had no effective course of attack; we can therefore conclude that any attack on TCH must exploit the internal features of the tweakable blockcipher upon which it is constructed, meaning that perhaps a tweakable blockcipher primitive might yield a secure TCH. The Hasty Pudding cipher is one example of a tweakable blockcipher primitive [15] , and some recent progress has been made by Goldenberg et al. on building tweakable blockcipher primitives from pseudorandom functions [6] . Whether using Hasty Pudding, for example, in TCH yields an efficient collision resistant hash function is left as an open question, but we can be certain that any attacks on TCH-HP would require the cryptanalyst delve into the inner workings of the Hasty Pudding cipher.
Conclusion and Open Problems
Our results give strong evidence that we cannot build rate-1 collision-resistant hash functions from a blockcipher that uses only a small set of keys. Does this mean we are forced to accept constructions that change the key arbitrarily with each round if we want provable security? Not necessarily. Our results say nothing about schemes in this framework that rekey, say, every other round. It would be interesting to show sufficient conditions on how often the blockcipher must be rekeyed in order to maintain a good collision resistance bound. Alternatively, perhaps the key can be fixed in a non-MerkleDamgård construction; the results of Gennaro et al. [5] , although for a different security property than we considered here, may provide some insight. Or perhaps there is some relaxation of the model and weakening of the adversary that admit security proofs for highly-efficient blockcipher-based schemes. We leave these as open questions.
